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11 Introduction
The problem of connecting currency crises to fundamentals has led to a discussion of
possible manipulation of exchange rates. It has become a ritual among many politi-
cians to denounce hedge funds and other highly leveraged institutions, especially for-
eign, for manipulating exchange rates during speculative pressure. In contrast, many
observers have argued that both fundamentals and large players may play a role.
The different views are reﬂected in the development of the theory on currency
crises. In the ﬁrst generation model of Krugman (1979), the collapse of the exchange
rate is inevitable due to deteriorating fundamentals. The second generation models,
e.g. Obstfeld (1986), show that there may be a multiplicity of equilibria, leading to
the possibility of self-fulﬁlling expectations of attack. If the market believes that an
attact will be successful, everyone attacks, making it too costly for the central bank
to defend the currency even with strong fundamentals. Hence, the initial belief is
conﬁrmed in the attack. These kinds of models cannot, however, explain the timing
of the attack. Morris and Shin (1998) show that the multiplicity of equilibria is due
to common knowledge of the fundamentals, and that only adding a small amount of
noise to the players’ signal on fundamentals results in a unique equilibrium where the
timing of the attack can be determined.
Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) extend the model of Morris and Shin
by introducing a single large player that might have superior information. By moving
early the large player can signal his information to the small players, thereby inducing
an attack. However, based on experiences from the erm and Asia-crises, Tabellini
(1994) and the imf (1998) argue that large players move in the rear in currency crises
because they beneﬁt from positive interest rate differentials. We extend the Corsetti et
al. model by allowing the large player to attack either before or after the small players.
An early attack will provide a signal to the small players, just as in the Corsetti et
al. model. On the other hand, by waiting to the last stages of the attack, the large
player may proﬁt from higher interest rates. The latter alternative is best if the attack
is sufﬁciently likely so that an early signal is viewed as unnecessary.
To explore the model, we consider three cases of speculative pressure on the Nor-
wegian krone (nok), and one case for the Swedish krona (sek). The Norwegian cases
are: (i) The attack during the erm-crisis in December 1992; (ii) the attack in January
1997; and (iii) the attack after the Russian moratorium in August 1998. The third crisis
is also our Swedish case. In 1992 Norway had a ﬁxed exchange rate, while the ex-
change rate was a managed ﬂoat in 1997 and 1998. Sweden had ofﬁcially a ﬂoating
exchange rate regime in 1998, but had intervened on several occasions since the erm-
crisis in 1992–93. In these situations, speculators may take currency positions in the
belief that monetary authorities will change the monetary regime, or at least allow for
2a considerable change in the exchange rate, in the near future.1
For Norway we have weekly data on currency trading by Norwegian banks with
Norwegian customers and foreigners. The data differentiates between spot and for-
ward trading and covers more than 90% of all trading in nok. Anecdotal evidence
from the Norwegian market suggests that the foreign investors are leveraged institu-
tions, or “large players”, while locals can be viewed as “small players”. This seems
particularly reasonable for periods of speculative pressure where foreigners can raise
more funds than locals. In Sweden several banks, assigned as “primary dealers”,
report their buying and selling of spot and forward against locals and foreigners.
Our results suggest that the behavior of large and small players differs before and
during speculative attacks. We ﬁnd that large players moved last during the three
attacks on the Norwegian krone (nok). Our model predicts that if the probability of
a successful attack is high, large players will choose to move late if there is some gain
from waiting, e.g., a high interest rate differential. This is also suggested by Tabellini
and the imf. Regression analysis also indicates that the trading of large players is
most important for triggering the actual attack. Furthermore, the sequence of the two
groups during the attack period is different from the sequence during the non-attack
period preceding the attack. During the attack on the Swedish krona (sek) in 1998,
it was the large players that moved early. However, interest rate differentials did not
increase during the attack so there was little to gain for the large players by a delayed
attack. The small players may be content with moving early during attacks due to less
liquid portfolios, as in Tabellini, less ability to move quickly, a closer relationship to
local authorities, or higher risk aversion.
To our knowledge only few papers exist on the topic of the role of large players.
Wei and Kim (1997) study the importance of large players using the Treasury Bulletin
reports. They ﬁnd that trading by large players adds to the volatility of exchange rates,
and argue that hedge funds act like “noise traders” in the Korean market. Corsetti,
Pesenti, and Roubini (2002) use the same data, and compile more informal information
about a number of speculative events. They ﬁnd support for the role of large players
and some indications of the presence of asymmetric information. Cai, Cheung, Lee,
and Melvin (2001) also use the Treasury Bulletin data and ﬁnd that the trading of large
players contributes to volatility during the unwinding of the yen-carry trade in 1998.
The combination of long time series on trading that covers a number of rele-
vant episodes, and information on disaggregated currency ﬂows, makes our data set
unique. Unlike the studies above, we have information on net positions of both large
and small players in the periods around a speculative attack. Further, the source of
our data covers almost the total market for the currencies under investigation. Finally,
while the former studies have focused on the Asian markets we focus on two European
1See e.g. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) who argue that even if a country ofﬁcially adopts a “ﬂexible”
exchange rate, they often tend to limit the ﬂuctuations of the exchange rate.
3economies. This adds a new dimension to the empirical ﬁndings in this ﬁeld.
In section 2 we present the model and discuss some empirical implications. Section
3 contains a description of our data and the institutional framework of the exchange
rate regime. Section 4 describes the empirical methodology and our results. Section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin (2004) (henceforth cdms) analyze a model with a
large player and a continuum of small players.2 In their analysis of sequential trading
cdms only consider the alternative where the large player speculates ﬁrst, so as to
create a signal affecting the behavior of the small players. However, as mentioned by
cdms, the imf, and Tabellini, there is anecdotal evidence indicating that large players
are in the rear, rather than at the front. Here we extend the theoretical framework of
cdms by allowing the large player both to speculate early, so as to affect the behavior
of the small players, and to speculate at a later stage in order to reap interest rate gains
as well. Thus, the timing decision of the large player is endogenous.
Consider an economy where the central bank aims at keeping the exchange rate
within a certain interval, either a well deﬁned, publicly known, narrow target zone, or
a less explicit “dirty ﬂoat” policy. There is a single “large” player, and a continuum of
“small” players indexed to [0,1]. The players may attack the currency by short selling
the currency, i.e. borrow domestic currency and sell it for dollars. The small players
taken together have a combined limit to short selling the domestic currency normal-
ized to 1. They decide independently and simultaneously whether or not to attack
the currency. If they attack there is a cost t > 0 to engaging in short selling. This
cost can be interpreted as trading costs and the interest rate differential between the
domestic currency and dollars.3 The costs are normalized so that the payoff to a suc-
cessful attack on the currency, leading to a devaluation/depreciation of the currency,
is given by 1, and the payoff from refraining from attack is 0. Thus, the net payoff
for small players of a successful attack on the currency is 1 − t, while the payoff to an
unsuccessful attack is −t.
The large player has access to a large line of credit in the domestic currency, en-
abling him to take a short position up to the limit of L > 0. In contrast to cdms,
however, we assume a different action set and cost structure for the large player. The
large player may trade at two different points in time, before and after the small play-
ers. Short selling before the action of the small players involves the cost t. Let λ denote
the size of any early short selling of the large player, where L ≥ λ ≥ 0. However, if
2We use “player[s]” in the rest of the paper, instead of, e.g., trader[s].
3Hence, the exchange rate is sufﬁciently under pressure so that the interest rate differential has
increased.
4a massive speculative attack ensures that it is clear that a devaluation will take place,
the large player has the opportunity to increase the speculative attack by using the rest
of his credit at a later stage. This assumption is meant to capture the notion that larger
players have better access to rapid information, and may react quicker in the market.
Speculating at a late stage involves two advantages. First, there is less uncertainty
as to the outcome of the attack, as there is no uncertainty as to the behavior of the
smaller players. Second, the cost is smaller, as the costs associated with the interest
rate differentials are incurred for a shorter period. To simplify the analysis, we shall
assume that an attack by the large player at the late stage involves no uncertainty and
no costs, implying a total gain to the large player of L−tλ if a devaluation takes place.
Following cdms, we let the strength of the economic fundamentals of the exchange
rate regime be indexed by a random variable θ. This can be interpreted as a reduced
form of the central bank reaction function, indicating how much reserves they are
willing to use in the defense. If the fundamentals support the current regime, i.e. are
strong, the central bank is willing to use more reserves in the defense. The strength
of the speculative attack is measured by the amount used by the players attacking the
currency. Whether the current exchange rate regime is viable depends on the strength
of the economic fundamentals relative to the strength of the speculative attack. To
keep the analysis simple, we assume that the large player only gets access to the credit
at the late stage if it is already clear that the exchange rate falls. A possible justiﬁcation
for this assumption is that if creditors do not see that the early attack succeeds, they
will not accept the risk involved in extending the rest of the credit (L−λ). Let ξ denote
the mass of small players that speculate. Then the exchange rate will fall if and only if
ξ + λ ≥ θ. (1)
If θ < 0 the exchange rate will depreciate irrespective of whether a speculative attack
takes place.
2.1 Information
The small players observe a private signal that yields information about the funda-
mentals as well as the amount of speculation of the larger player. A typical small
player i observes
xi = θ − λ + σεi, (2)
where σ > 0 is a scaling-constant to the variance of the signal x. The individual speciﬁc
noise εi is distributed according to a smooth symmetric and single-peaked density
f (·) with mean zero, and F(·) as the associated c.d.f. The noise εi is assumed to be
i.i.d. across players. Note that the small players cannot distinguish the information
they obtain about the fundamentals from the information about the speculation of
5the larger player; they only observe a noisy signal of the difference between the two.
This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis considerably. It also captures an element of
realism, as small players in reality cannot veriﬁably observe large players’ moves in
the FX market since there is no disclosure requirements in FX markets.
The larger player observes
y = θ + τη, (3)
where τ > 0 is a scaling-constant to the variance of the signal, and the random term η
is distributed according to a smooth symmetric and single-peaked density g(·) with
mean zero. To obtain explicit solutions, we assume further that g(·) is strictly increas-
ing for all negative arguments, and strictly decreasing for all positive arguments. G(·)
is the associated c.d.f.
2.2 Analysis
We ﬁrst consider the action of the small players, given the prior decision of the large
player. We then consider the decision of the large player of whether to initiate an early
attack.
Following cdms, we will assume that the small players follow trigger strategies
in which players attack the currency if the signal falls below a critical value x∗.4 As
in the analysis of cdms, there is a unique equilibrium which can be characterized by
two critical values, (θ − λ)
∗ and x∗, where the former captures that the currency will
always collapse if the difference between the fundamental θ and the early speculation
of the large player λ is below the critical value, while the latter is the critical value in
the trigger strategy of the small players.
These critical values can be derived in the same way as in the analysis of the
benchmark case in section 2.2.1 of cdms. Given the trigger strategy, and that the true
state is θ − λ, the probability that a small player i will attack the currency is identical
to the probability that the player’s signal xi ≤ x∗, i.e.













Since there is a continuum of small players, and their noise terms are independent,
there is no aggregate uncertainty as to the behavior of the small players, so that the
mass of small players attacking, ξ, is equal to this probability. As F(.) is strictly
increasing, it is apparent that the incidence of the speculative attack is greater, the
weaker the strength of the economic fundamentals, less the early speculation of the
large player (θ − λ).
4cdms show that there are no other equilibria in more complex strategies.
6A speculative attack will be successful if the mass of small players that speculate
exceeds the strength of the economic fundamentals, less the early speculation of the
large player, i.e. if
F

x∗ − (θ − λ)
σ

≥ θ − λ.
Thus, the critical value (θ − λ)∗, for which the mass of small players that attack is
just sufﬁcient to cause a devaluation, is given by the equality
F





= (θ − λ)
∗ . (4)
For lower values of (θ − λ), the incidence of speculation is larger, and the strength of
the ﬁxed exchange rate lower, implying that an attack will be successful if θ − λ ≤
(θ − λ)
∗.
Consider then the trigger strategies of the small players. A player observes a signal
xi, and, given this signal, the success-probability of an attack is given by
prob
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where the last equality follows from the symmetry of f (.), F(ν) = 1 − F(−ν). The






















For the marginal player, the expected payoff of attacking the currency must be zero,








To solve for the equilibrium, we rearrange (5) to obtain (θ − λ)
∗ = x∗ + σF−1(t).





















7Thus, the critical values are
(θ − λ)
∗ = 1− t, and (6a)
x∗ = 1− t − σF−1 (t). (6b)
These critical values correspond to the critical values in cdms, the only novelty being
the addition of the early speculation of the large player λ.
Before proceeding, let us brieﬂy describe the economic outcome so far. As noted
above, there is no aggregate uncertainty as to the behavior of the small players. All
players observing a signal xi ≤ x∗ will attack. If θ − λ ≤ (θ − λ)
∗, the speculative
attack will be successful. If t < 1






= 0), so that x∗ > θ − λ. Thus, in this case a small player will attack even if
he observes a signal xi ∈ (θ − λ, x∗), i.e., even if he observes a signal that, if it were
accurate, the attack would not be successful. This is because the gain from a successful
attack in this case is greater than the loss from an unsuccessful one, so from equation
(5) we see that the small player will accept a probability of success below 1
2.
We then consider the decision of the large player of whether to speculate at an
early stage, and if so, by how much. For a given probability of devaluation, it is clearly
better to enter late so as to save speculation costs. However, as is apparent from (6a), a
devaluation will take place if the fundamental θ ≤ θ∗ ≡ 1− t + λ, implying that early
speculation λ > 0 will increase the probability that a devaluation takes place. Thus,
the large player will weigh the gain from increasing the probability of a devaluation
by early speculation against the costs of doing so.
The expected payoff by attacking in the amount λ ≥ 0 at an early stage is
Eπ = L · prob[θ ≤ 1− t + λ|y] − tλ = L · G





where we again use the symmetry of the distribution.
The ﬁrst order condition for an interior solution λ∗ is
∂Eπ
∂λ
= L · g






− t = 0. (7)
Note ﬁrst that if Lg(0) 1
τ − t < 0 (which is equivalent to g(0) < τt
L ), then it is never
optimal to speculate early, as this implies that ∂Eπ
∂λ < 0 for all y and λ (recall that the
density g(.) has its maximum for the argument zero). The intuition is straightforward:
if the gain from a successful speculative attack (L) is too small relative to the cost of
speculation (t) and the effect of attempts to induce a speculative attack (g(.) and τ),
then it will never be proﬁtable to try to induce a speculative attack. Or, if the “large”
player is not particularly larger than the small he will not try to induce the small to
speculate by early trading. In the sequel, we shall assume that g(0) > τt
L , implying
8that it will be proﬁtable to induce a speculative attack under some circumstances, as
will be discussed below.
The second order condition for an interior solution is
∂2Eπ
∂λ2 = L · g0






From the second order condition it follows that the optimal λ∗ must satisfy
1−t+λ∗−y
τ >
0, so that g0(.) < 0.5
Restricting attention to the interval
1−t+λ−y
τ > 0, so that g0(.) < 0, and hence the
inverse of g(.) is deﬁned, we can solve (7) for the optimal λ:














Let yLo be the value of y for which the optimal early speculation λ∗ is zero, i.e.






Proposition 1 Assume that g(0) > τt
L . Then there exist critical values yHi and yLo such that
if the signal of the large player y is below or above these critical values, y ≤ yLo or y ≥ yHi,




strategy is to speculate early, setting λ = λ∗ > 0, where λ∗ is given by (8). A marginal change
in the speculation costs t has an ambiguous effect on the optimal early speculation by the large,
λ∗.
The proof is in the appendix. The intuition behind the proposition is presented
in Fig. 1, and can be explained as follows. The horizontal line tτ/L represents the
marginal cost of speculating early, while the bell-shaped curve is the g-distribution.
If the signal of the large player y is low (below yLo), indicating that the fundamental
θ is likely to be low, the large player will view a devaluation as so likely that he
will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to incur the costs by early speculation, even if this would
increase the probability of a devaluation. Nor will the large player ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to speculate early if the signal of the large player y is high (above yHi), indicating
that the fundamental θ is likely to be high, as in this case it will be too costly to
raise the probability of a devaluation. However, for interior values of y, the gain from
increasing the probability of a successful speculative attack by an early speculation of
5For
1−t+λ−y
τ < 0, we have g0(.) > 0 implying that ∂2Eπ
∂λ2 > 0, so that a solution to (7) would be a
local proﬁt minimum.
9the large player is sufﬁciently large to outweigh the costs, and the large player will
indeed speculate early.
For concreteness, let the large player receive a signal y0. By speculating in amount
λ0 he increases the probability of a successful attack by moving left along the g-curve.






than marginal cost tτ/L. However, by increasing λ further, he enters the region where
marginal beneﬁts are higher than marginal costs (as indicated by area A in Fig. 1, and





If the large player receives a signal yHi, he is indifferent between zero early specula-





This is reﬂected in the area A (where marginal gain exceeds marginal costs) being
equal to area B (where marginal gain is lower than marginal costs).
































is given by the dotted horizontal line. The bell-shaped curve, g(.), represents the
marginal gain. For y ∈
 
yLo,yHi
the optimal strategy is to speculate early, setting λ = λ∗.




starting at zero for yLo and reaching its maximum for yHi, and then falls to zero again
for y ≥ yHi.
The ambiguous effect of an increase in the speculation costs on the amount of
early speculation reﬂects two opposing effects. On the one hand, higher speculation
costs will reduce speculation by small players, inducing the large player to do more
early speculation himself (cf. equation (8)). On the other hand, higher speculation
costs make it more costly to speculate early, which has a dampening effect on early
speculation.
103 Data and description of crises
3.1 Trading data
Norges Bank and Sveriges Riksbank collect data from market making banks on net
spot and forward transactions with different counterparties. From Norges Bank we
have weekly observations on Norwegian market making banks’ trading with foreign-
ers, locals, and the central bank.6 Foreign participants are typically dominated by
ﬁnancial investors, especially in periods of turbulence. In the data set from Sveriges
Riksbank we have weekly observations on market making banks’ (both Swedish and
foreign) trading with non-market making foreign banks and with Swedish non-bank
customers. The ﬁrst group represents ﬁnancial investors (see Bjønnes, Rime, and Sol-
heim, 2005). We will henceforth refer to locals as small players and foreigners as large
players.
The Norwegian data distinguish between spot and forward. The Swedish data
also contain swap and option volumes, in addition to purchases and sales of spot and
forward contracts. For Norway we have observations from 1991, while the Swedish
data set starts in 1993. Further information about the two data set will be given in the
discussion of the three crises below.
3.2 Three crisis periods in Scandinavia
In this section we give a brief overview of the three crisis periods that we analyze:
(i) the erm-crisis and the depreciation of the Norwegian krone in December 1992; (ii)
the appreciation of the Norwegian krone in January 1997; and (iii) the crisis in both
Norway and Sweden following the Russian moratorium in August 1998. Fig. 2 shows
the nok/eur and sek/eur exchange rates, together with the Norwegian sight deposit
rate and the Swedish discount rate and the 3-month interest rate differential against
Germany for the two countries, from the beginning of 1990 until the end of 2000.7
The key dates for the attacks can be identiﬁed e.g. from the ﬁnancial press. In
addition we have created the usual “crisis index” used to identify events with special
pressure on the exchange rate (see e.g. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz, 1995, for
a description). The crisis index, which take into account that speculative pressure
may materialize through interest rate changes instead of exchange rate changes, also
identiﬁes these three periods. The index identiﬁes several single events, but these three
periods are the only clusters of events.8
6Foreigner and local are deﬁned by their address.
7The euro was introduced Jan. 1, 1999. Using euro-rates implies that we use the nok/dem and
sek/dem exchange rates adjusted for the dem/eur-conversion.
8The results for the crisis index are available upon request.
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3.2.1 The ERM-crisis: 1992
The 1992-event has the features of a “traditional” currency crisis. Prior to 1992 both
Norway and Sweden had pegged their exchange rates to the ecu, with a ﬂuctuation
band of ± 2.5% and ± 1.5% respectively. From Fig. 2 we see that during 1991 and until
October 1992 the Norwegian exchange rate was stable (around a level of 7.65 against
the ecu). In August ﬁrst Finland and Italy, and later the UK, were forced to abandon
their ﬁxed pegs. Sweden withstood an attack in September, but chose to devalue in
late November after increasing interest rates to 500%. Under the speculative pressure
during the fall of 1992, Norges Bank repeatedly increased its key rate to reduce capital
outﬂows. On December 10, 1992, Norges Bank was forced to abandon the ﬁxed ecu-
rate. The exchange rate stabilized in the interval between 8.3 and 8.4 against the ecu,
implying a change of about 10% from middle rate to middle rate.
In Fig. 3 we see the levels of net positions in spot and forward for small (locals)
and large (foreigners) players in the period from May 1992 to January 1993. One of the
most striking features of this ﬁgure might be how stable these positions are throughout
the ﬁrst part of 1992. The only position that reveals a change is large players’ (foreign)
forward. Here we see a trend out of nok-holdings from early August 1992. At this
time the interest rate differential was very small. The holdings do, however, stabilize
in October 1992. In November 1992 speculative activity emerges in two forms: Small
players sold nok spot and large players (foreigners) sold nok forward. This is as one
should expect. Small players (locals) have a larger part of their portfolio in nok, and
should therefore be able to sell nok spot. Large players (foreigners) hold presumably
a more limited amount spot.





































Note: A negative number indicates a net holding of nok. Exchange rates measured along the right axis and ﬂows on the left axis.
3.2.2 The Norwegian crisis: 1997
In the aftermath of the erm-crisis Norway and Sweden chose different monetary policy
regimes. Sweden adopted a formal inﬂation target of 2% in 1993. Norway, on the
other hand, chose a managed ﬂoat regime. Norges Bank had an obligation to stabilize
the exchange rate, but only in a medium-term sense. Extreme measures to hold the
exchange rate within bounds in the short term were not to be used.9
In January 1997 there was speculation inducing an appreciation of the Norwegian
krone. The cost of a dem in nok fell by more than 5% over a period of 14 days with the
largest changes on Jan. 8th – 10th, while the sek/dem was largely unaffected. Pressure
against nok had been building for some time prior to this. A number of newspaper re-
ports referred to the role of foreigners speculating in a Norwegian appreciation during
the fall of 1996. For instance, on November 5, 1996, the leading business newspaper
in Norway (Dagens Næringsliv) reported that foreign analysts “believe in stronger
nok”.10 Already on the next day, Norges Bank lowered its key rate. According to
newspapers, Kjell Storvik (the governor of the central bank) hoped that this would
reduce the interest in nok among foreign investors.11 On November 29, 1996, Dagens
Næringsliv states that
[f]oreigners have again thrown themselves over the Norwegian krone.
9The monetary policy regulation from May 6, 1994, stated: “... monetary policy instruments will
be oriented with a view to returning the exchange rate over time to its initial range. No ﬂuctuation
margins are established, nor is there an appurtenant obligation on Norges Bank to intervene in the




13[...] People in the market [...] believe that the strengthening is a result of
foreign investors now believing nok is so cheap that it is a good buy.12
The speculators believed that a strong Norwegian economy and emerging inﬂa-
tionary pressure would force the Norwegian government to change from a managed
ﬂoat to an inﬂation targeting regime. Inﬂation targeting would allow Norges Bank
to set interest rates higher to ﬁght inﬂation and dampen a potential boom, with little
regard for a potentially steep appreciation of the nok. Norges Bank instead defended
the exchange rate by lowering its key rate.
Fig. 4 shows the nok/dem exchange rate and the level of net positions during the
period from August 1996 to February 1997. First, note that there is no movement in the
forward positions over this period. Second, we see that the exchange rate was trending
down from early September 1996. In the period from September to December small
players (locals) accumulated spot foreign currency positions as the exchange rate was
appreciating. Large players (foreigners) did not change their net positions. During the
speculative attack in the ﬁrst weeks of 1997, the central dates were January 6-7, 1997,
large players (foreigners) were buying nok spot. At this time small players (locals)
were selling nok spot.



































Note: A negative number indicates a net holding of nok. Exchange rates measured along the right axis and ﬂows on the left axis.
3.2.3 The Russian moratorium crisis: August 1998
The 1998-crisis in Norway and Sweden took place at the same time as Russia declared
a debt moratorium, which was the starting point of a period with substantial inter-
national ﬁnancial turbulence and uncertainty. Russia experienced a boom during the
12Haug (1996).
14mid-1990’s, not least due to high oil prices. However, in June 1998 Russia began to
experience balance-of-payment problems as oil prices had fallen substantially through
the year.13 Russia turned to negotiations with the imf and international creditors, and,
after severe problems, an agreement was reached on the evening of Sunday, July 12. In
the ten days prior to this agreement the central bank of Russia had sold usd 1.6 billion
in attempts to stabilize the exchange rate. During August the crisis reemerged, and
on August 17 the Russian president Boris Jeltsin announced a reform package includ-
ing a possible devaluation of the rouble. The result was a meltdown of international
conﬁdence. On August 24 Russia declared a moratorium on all debt payments. This
event triggered massive international uncertainty. Investors withdrew money from
small currencies, including the nok and sek, and countries with a high share of raw
material exports were hit especially hard.
In Norway the largest changes in the exchange rate came on the 24th and the days
immediately following. Market participants had for some time expected a change in
the monetary regime, from a managed ﬂoat to inﬂation targeting. During the spring of
1998 Norway experienced a slowdown in growth, and many argued for monetary and
ﬁscal stimulus in order to spur growth.14 A change to inﬂation targeting was expected
to have resulted in lower short-term interest rates in order to stimulate growth, and
thus a weaker currency.
The reaction functions of Norges Bank and Sveriges Riksbank are partly revealed
when we look at Fig. 2. We see that while Norges Bank increased its key rate as the
nok/dem depreciated in July and August, Sveriges Riksbank did not adjust its key
rate in response to changes in the exchange rate during this period. This is a clear
indication of two very different monetary policy regimes. A key implication is that in
Norway delayed speculation would involve a beneﬁt from the interest rate differential.
In contrast, in Sweden, there was no increase in the interest rate and thus no reason to
postpone speculation.
Figs. 5(a) and 5(b) show nok/dem and sek/dem exchange rates and the level of
net positions during the period from May 1996 to December 1998. Again we see that
in Norway small players (locals) were accumulating foreign currency spot during the
summer. When the large players (foreigners) attacked in August they did so in the
forward market. This sale of nok was matched by small players (locals) buying nok
forward. In Sweden the large players (foreigners) were selling sek in July and August,
with a peak around the Russian moratorium. Small players (locals), on the other hand,
were buying sek forward.
13Oil prices fell from usd 17 at the beginning of 1998 to an average price of usd 12.50 in the period
June-October 1998.
14Norway’s leading indicator peaked in December 1997, and decreased during 1998.
15Figure 5: The exchange rate and the level of net positions: The 1998 Russian morato-






























































Note: A negative number indicates a net holding of nok. Exchange rates measured along the right axis and ﬂows on the left axis.
164 Results
Ideally, we would want to test the model by exploring to what extent the value of
the signal to the large player could explain the trading behavior and the effect on the
exchange rate. However, the signal is not observable to us. Our observable variables
are caused by the fundamentals as well as the action of the players. Thus, our test
will focus on variables we can observe, along two lines: (i) The sequence of move of
the large and small players, and (ii) which players trigger the actual change in the
exchange rate. Let us repeat: If fundamentals are weak, i.e., a successful attack is very
likely, large players will move in the rear in order to reap the interest rate beneﬁt (if
any), while small players will move early. If fundamentals are stronger, or the interest
rate beneﬁt is small, large players may move early as well in order to induce small
players to join in on the attack. Only in the case where large players only speculate
early will we see that only small players trigger the exchange rate change. Further, we
have identiﬁed four speciﬁc events, three in Norway and one in Sweden, for which we
will test these hypotheses. Since foreigners can raise more funds on short notice we
will treat foreigners as large players.
To test for the sequence in the speculative attacks we will use the statistical concept
of Granger causality. Granger causality is not an economic deﬁnition of causality, but
might be useful to distinguish between which group of players move ﬁrst or last.
There is absence of Granger causality from x to y if estimation of a variable y on
lagged values of y and lagged values of x are equivalent to an estimation of y on only
lagged values of y. This can be expressed as








βixt−i + εt, (9)
where the variable x does not Granger cause y if the joint hypothesis of β1 = ... =
βk = 0 is not rejected.
When choosing the sample for the Granger causality test we take the crisis dates
as our starting point. We end the samples as soon as there are any signs that the
exchange rate has stabilized, i.e. when the crisis is over. The beginning of the sample is
determined similarly, and in addition adding observations in the beginning to ensure
that the sample is sufﬁciently long for statistical analysis. This balances the need for a
sufﬁcient number of observations without mixing crisis periods and calm periods.
The results from the Granger causality tests are shown in Table 1. We regress the
ﬁrst-difference of the net position used in the attack, as seen from the graphs of Figs.
3 to 5, on the ﬁrst lag of smalls (locals) ﬂows and larges (foreigners) ﬂows. We use
dummies to differentiate between crisis period and pre-crisis period, and p-values are

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18and pre-crisis periods, for different lag-structures and var-formulations, that indicate
that the results are rather robust.
For the three Norwegian crises we see that lagged speculation of small players
has a signiﬁcant positive effect on the speculation of large players, while the lagged
speculation of large players has no signiﬁcant effect on the small players’ speculation.
Thus, small players Granger cause large players. This is in line with the model since in
all three cases interest rate differentials changed in such a way to make it more costly
to speculate early, implying that large players might gain from delaying the attack.
For the Swedish 1998-crisis there is some evidence that large players Granger cause
small players, as lagged speculation of large players is signiﬁcant in the small player
regression. This result is also consistent with the model since large players (foreign-
ers) did not have a gain from waiting as Sveriges Riksbank did not increase interest
rates; hence risk-adjusted gains by moving late were lower. In Sweden, no change in
monetary policy was expected, indicating a higher fundamental θ, and a higher signal
y. On the other hand, lower Swedish interest rates meant that speculation costs were
lower, i.e. lower t. For small players, low θ and low t have opposing effects, leaving
the impact on speculation indeterminate. For large players, however, it follows directly
from (8) and the proof of the Proposition in the appendix, that, keeping the sum of the
signal and the speculation costs, y + t, constant, an increase in speculation costs leads
to less early speculation by the large player. In other words, in the speculative attack
in Sweden, where interest rates were low, we would expect more early speculation by
the large player.
Finally, a comparison of the pre-crisis and crisis part of Table 1 (and Table 6 in
the appendix) we see that the pattern discussed above is not representative for the
pre-crisis periods. This is consistent with the idea of the model that trading sequences
during an attack are different from non-crisis periods.
The second question is to identify which group was most active during the actual
crisis. To investigate this question we use the following strategy. We regress changes in
the exchange rate on contemporaneous changes in ﬂows and macro variables. Due to
problems of multicollinearity we run separate regressions for small (locals) and large
(foreigners) players.
The sample is selected in the same way as in the gc-analysis. We use the same
observations as above, but since we also estimate ﬂow effects outside of the actual
crisis we merge these three periods. The focus is on what happens during the actual
speculative attack. Hence, for each crisis we create dummies that equal one the week
before the actual attack and the largest changes around the ofﬁcial date, and zero
otherwise. This gives us three crisis-observations (dummy equals one) for 1992 and




on Foreign ﬂows on Local ﬂows
Constant -0.00013 0.00046
(-0.17) (0.50)
Interest rate diff -0.00062 -0.00240
(-1.07) (-3.77) **
Oil price -0.02894 -0.03162
(-1.45) (-1.47)
92-crisis, spot 0.00839 -0.00147
(3.75) ** (-1.39)
92-crisis, forward 0.00687 0.00432
(4.29) ** (1.68)
97-crisis, spot 0.00226 0.00088
(3.31) ** (1.10)
97-crisis, forward 0.00034 -0.00903
(0.23) (-2.50) *
98-crisis, spot 0.00238 -0.00183
(1.15) (-4.01) **
98-crisis, forward 0.00167 -0.00152











on Large’s ﬂows on Small’s ﬂows
Constant 0.0005 -0.0001
(1.02) (-0.20)
Interest rate diff. 0.0174 0.0189
(5.24) ** (5.56) **
Oil price -0.0175 -0.0180
(-1.99) * (-2.01) *
98-crisis, Spot 0.0033 0.0027
(0.66) (0.18)
98-crisis, Forward -0.0078 -0.0070
(-0.29) (-0.71)
Spot 0.0079 -0.0058
(5.82) ** (-4.18) **
Forward 0.0067 -0.0037
(5.59) ** (-2.70) **
AR(1) -0.1829 -0.1513
(-4.11) ** (-3.41) **
adj.R2 0.14 0.12
DW-stat. 2.00 1.99
In the regressions we include the 3-month interest rate differential against Germany
and the log-differenced oil price as macroeconomic variables. The rows labeled “Spot”
and “Forward” report the coefﬁcients and t-values for ﬂows outside the actual crisis,
while the other rows are the effect of ﬂow in the different crisis. For Sweden we only
consider the 1998-crisis.
From the informal discussion as well as the gc-analysis above, we would expect
that large players (foreigners) were instrumental in the three Norwegian crises. This
should be reﬂected in signiﬁcant and positive coefﬁcients, as players buy currency
(positive ﬂow) when speculating on a depreciation (positive change in the exchange
rate), and sell when speculating on an appreciation. In the 1992- and 1998- crises,
foreigners speculated forward (as they have less spot available), while they used spot
in the 1997- appreciation crisis.
We would also expect that the small players (locals) ﬂow is insigniﬁcant in all three
crisis in the case of Norway, and at least not positive. From Table 2 we see that these
expectations are largely borne through. In addition, the large players’ (foreigners)
spot ﬂow is signiﬁcant and positive for the 1992-crisis, and some of the small players’
(locals) ﬂows are signiﬁcant and negative for the 1997 and 1998-crises. Negative coef-
ﬁcients imply that the small players (locals) are providing liquidity to the large players
(foreigners) during the actual attack.
For Sweden we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant effects during the 1998-crisis. Given
the evidence that large players (foreigners) Granger caused small players (locals) we
21would expect that at least the small players (locals) were positive and signiﬁcant. How-
ever, Fig. 5 seems to suggest that it is the large players that are most active in the crisis
week, and that the period when the sek actually jumped was somewhat later.
For Norway, we see that the strength of the correlation differs somewhat between
the three events. For the 1992-case we ﬁnd a size effect of forward ﬂow is 0.69% per
billion nok sold, or about 5% per 1 billion usd equivalent.15 For the 1997-event we
ﬁnd the spot-effect to be about 1.6% per 1 billion usd equivalent. For the 1998-event
we ﬁnd the effect of forward to be approximately 1.2% per 1 billion usd equivalent. As
a comparison Evans and Lyons (2002) report an effect from order ﬂow to the dem/usd
exchange rate of about 0.5% per 1 billion usd equivalent. The larger effect of given
currency trade on the exchange rate that we ﬁnd seems reasonable given that the
nok/dem market is much smaller than the dem/usd market. The lower numbers for
1997 and 1998 might be due to increased liquidity, less rigid monetary regimes, and
possibly that external events were more important than changes in currency positions
during these events.
5 Conclusion
We study the dynamics of speculative attacks. The problem of connecting currency
crises to fundamentals has led to a discussion of possible manipulation of exchange
rates, especially by large foreign players like hedge funds and other highly leveraged
institutions. To analyze this we extend the model of Corsetti et al. (2004) to allow large
players to move both prior and after small players during a speculative attack. The
model of Corsetti et al. (2004) predicts that large players may move early in an attack
in order to induce small players to attack. It has, however, been argued by Tabellini
(1994) and the imf that large players move in the rear in currency crises because they
beneﬁt from higher interest rate differentials. In our model the large players may
choose to speculate early, at the same cost as small players, or later at a lower cost.
The lower cost is due to beneﬁts of higher interest rate differentials. The small players
are not able to speculate late because in that case one must be able to move quickly in
order to not be too late. The predictions of the model are the following: If there is no
gain from speculating late, the large player will speculate early. If there are gains from
speculating late, the strategy of the large player depends on his signal of fundamentals.
If fundamentals are very weak, large players will do all their speculation late as there
is no gain from inducing the small players to join in the attack. If fundamentals are
stronger, the large players may choose to speculate early with some of their funds.
Unless the large players’ signal on fundamentals is so strong that they choose to do all
their speculation early, the change in position of the large players will be the one that
15The average nok/usd rate over the period 1992-2000 was 7.4.
22triggers the attack.
The implications of the model are then tested using data on net positions of large
(foreigners) and small (locals) players in Norway and Sweden for the following four
speculative attacks during the 1990s: The erm-attack in 1992 on the Norwegian krone;
the 1997 apprectionary crisis in Norway; and the August 1998 crisis following the
Russian moratorium. In the latter case we can also compare with Sweden, using
similar data, which also experienced speculative pressure but followed a different
strategy than the central bank of Norway. The sequence of trading is tested with
Granger causality tests, while the triggering of the attacks is tested with regression
analysis. We ﬁnd that small players lead the large players in all cases except the 1998-
crisis in Sweden. This is in line with the model since the Norwegian central bank used
interest rates to defend the krone in all cases, while the Swedish central bank did not
change its interest rate during the depreciation crisis in 1998. Hence, while there was
a gain for the large players by delaying the attack in Norway, there was no gain by
delaying the attack for large players in Sweden. The regression analysis shows that it
was the large players that triggered the attack in all cases. We can not condition on the
signal of the players in the regressions. The fact that all attacks were successful may,
however, indicate that fundamentals in Norway in all three cases were in the region
where large players preferred to move in the rear.
This paper is to the best of our knowledge the ﬁrst that is able to study speculative
attacks with data on the positions of both large (foreign) and small (local) players.
A Proof of Proposition
For later use, note that the expected payoff given an early speculation λ∗ is given by
Eπ∗ = L · G




















where we use equation (8) to substitute for λ∗.
The expected payoff from not speculating early, yet entering at a late stage in the
amount L (at zero cost), is
Eπ0 = L · G













τ − t < 0, as it follows from the derivation above that
1. ∂Eπ
∂λ = 0 for y = yLo and λ = 0.




It follows that in this interval the optimal early speculation is zero, λ = 0 (as we
do not allow negative speculation)
We then restrict attention to y > yLo. Deﬁne the difference between the proﬁt under
optimal early speculation and the proﬁt with no early speculation W(y) ≡ Eπ∗ − Eπ0.
Using (10) and (11), we obtain














− L · G
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We have that W(yLo) = 0, as it is optimal to set the early speculation at zero for




= −t + L · g
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τ ≥ 0. It is clear that in
this interval ∂W
∂y > 0, since g(.) is strictly decreasing for positive arguments, implying
that g(.) is greater for smaller arguments (i.e., for y ≥ yLo). It follows that W(y) > 0
in this interval; this implies that it is proﬁtable to speculate early in a quantity λ∗ > 0
in this interval.
Then consider all y satisfying
1−t−y
τ < 0. We have
∂2W
∂y2 = −L · g0






implying that W is strictly concave. As W clearly goes to minus inﬁnity as y converges
to inﬁnity, there is a unique value yHi for which W(yHi) = 0. Thus, for y > yHi, then
W(y) < 0, implying that early speculation is not proﬁtable, i.e. set λ = 0. However, in
the interval y ∈
 
yLo,yHi
, W(y) > 0, implying that early speculation is proﬁtable, in
the amount λ∗.
24B Tables
Table 4: Summary of bivariate Granger causality tests for ﬂows during crisis: Norway,
1992, 1997 and 1998 crises
Note: Table shows all signiﬁcant (5% -level, 10% -level if marked with *) bivariate Granger causality relationships for the crisis-
periods deﬁned above, for lag 1 to 4. Relationships in bold conﬁrm our previous results.
Lags=1 Lags=2 Lags=3 Lags=4
1992 Levels Ss⇒Ls Ss⇒Ls Ss⇒Ls
Ss⇒Lf Ss⇔Lf Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf
St⇒Ls St⇒Ls
St⇒Lf St⇒Lf St⇒Lf St⇒Lf
Lt⇒Ss
Sf⇔Lf Lf⇒Sf Lf⇒Sf Lf⇒Sf
Lt⇒Sf Lt⇒Sf Lt⇒Sf Lt⇒Sf
Differences Ss⇒Ls Ss⇒Ls Ss⇒Ls Ss⇒Ls
Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf
St⇒Ls St⇒Ls (St⇒Ls)*
St⇒Lf St⇒Lf St⇒Lf St⇒Lf
Lf⇒Sf




Ss⇒Lt Ss⇒Lt Ss⇒Lt Ss⇒Lt
St⇒Lt St⇒Lt St⇒Lt St⇒Lt
Lt⇒Sf Lt⇒Sf
Ls⇒Sf Ls⇒Sf




St⇒Lf St⇒Lf St⇒Lf St⇔Lf
Ss⇒Lt Ss⇔Lt Ss⇒Lt Ss⇒Lt
St⇒Lt St⇔Lt St⇒Lt St⇒Lt
1998 Levels Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf
St⇒Lf St⇒Lf St⇒Lf
Ss⇒Lt Ss⇒Lt Ss⇒Lt
St⇒Lt St⇒Lt St⇒Lt St⇒Lt
Lf⇒Sf Lf⇒Sf Sf⇒Lf Lf⇒Sf
Sf⇒Lt Lt⇒Sf Sf⇔Lt Lt⇒Sf
Differences Ss⇒Lf (Ss⇒Lf)* (Ss⇒Lf)*
Lf⇒Sf Lf⇒Sf Lf⇒Sf Lf⇒Sf
Lt⇒Sf Sf⇔Lt Lt⇔Sf
25Table 5: Summary of bivariate Granger causality tests for ﬂows during crisis: Sweden,
1998-crisis
Note: Table shows all signiﬁcant (5% -level, 10% -level if marked with *) bivariate Granger causality relationships for the crisis-
periods deﬁned above, for lag 1 to 4. Relationships in bold conﬁrm our previous results.
Lags=1 Lags=2 Lags=3 Lags=4
Swe 1998 Levels Lf⇒Sf Lf⇒Sf Lf⇒Sf Lf⇒Sf
Lf⇒St Lf⇒St Lf⇒Ss
Ls⇒Sf Ls⇒Sf Ls⇒Sf
Differences Lf⇒Sf Lf⇔Sf Lf⇒Sf
Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf
Table 6: Bivariate Granger Causality tests for non-crises period
Note: Table shows all signiﬁcant (5% -level, 10% -level if marked with *) bivariate Granger causality relationships for the periods
prior to the crisis-periods deﬁned above, for lag 1 to 4.
Lags=1 Lags=2 Lags=3 Lags=4
Nor 1992 Levels Ss⇔Ls Ss⇔Ls Ls⇔Ss Ls⇒Ss
Lf⇒Ss Lf⇒Ss Lf⇒Ss Lf⇒Ss















Differences Ls⇔Ss Ls⇒Ss Ls⇒Ss Ls⇔Ss
Ls⇔St Lf⇒Ss Lf⇒Ss Lf⇒Ss
Lf⇒St Ls⇒St Lf⇔St
Lf⇔St Lf⇔Ls
Swe 1998 Levels Ls⇒Lf Ls⇒Lf Ls⇒Lf
Sf⇒Lf Sf⇒Lf Sf⇒Lf Sf⇒Lf
Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf
St⇒Lf
Sf⇔Ls Sf⇔Ls Sf⇔Ls Sf⇔Ls
Ss⇒Ls Ss⇒Ls
Lt⇔Sf Lt⇔Sf Lt⇔Sf Lt⇔Sf
Ss⇒Lt Ss⇒Lt
Differences None
26Table 7: Summary of Granger causality test for ﬂows during crises: Alternative speci-
ﬁcations
Note: Bivar. gc is gc-tests within a bivariate var, Trivar. gc is gc-tests within a trivariate var, and All Flows refer to a var
with all four ﬂows included. In the “Large spec. trivariate var” we include the ﬂow variable the Large player (foreign) used
for speculation and the two ﬂows of the Small players (locals), and vice versa in the “Small spec. trivariate var”. Small players
(locals) always speculate in spot, while Large players (foreign) speculate with spot in 1997 and with forward in 1992 and 1998.
All tests performed at the 5%-level or better, and only signiﬁcant ones are reported. We investigate formulations with 1 to 4 lags.
Numbers in parenthesis indicate which lag the Granger causality is valid for, unless it is valid for all speciﬁcations. We use the
following two-letter abbreviations for ﬂows: First letter indicates large (L) or small (S). Second letter indicates spot (s), or forward
(f), or sum of spot and forward (t).
Bivar. GC Trivar. GC All ﬂows
Foreign spec. Small spec.
1992 Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf
Nor. St⇒Lf Lf⇒Sf Lf⇒Ls Lf⇒Ls
Lf⇔Sf Ss⇔Ls (1) Ss⇒Ls Ss⇒Ls
St⇒Ls Ss⇒Ls (2) Lf⇒Sf
Ss⇒Sf
1997 Ss⇒Ls (1) Ss⇒Ls (1) Ss⇒Ls Ss⇒Ls
Nor. Ss⇒Lt Ls⇒Sf Lf⇒Ls Sf⇒Lf
St⇒Lt Ss⇔Ls (2,3) Ss⇒Lf (2) Lf⇒Ls





1998 Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf Ss⇒Lf
Nor. St⇒Lf Lf⇒Sf (1) Ls⇒Lf (3,4) Lf⇒Sf (1)





1998 Ls⇒Ss Sf⇒Ls (1) Ls⇒Ss Ls⇒Ss (4)
Swe. Ls⇒Sf (4) Sf⇔Ls (4) Lf⇒Ls (1) Lf⇒Ss
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